A mid-air collision in January 2025 near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), which resulted in 67 fatalities, has been attributed to systemic failures within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the U.S. Army, according to a year-long investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Following its comprehensive findings, the NTSB has expressed opposition to a provision in a proposed defense policy bill, asserting that it could reverse aviation safety enhancements previously recommended by the agency.
Collision Overview and Investigation Findings
On January 29, 2025, a military Black Hawk helicopter and American Airlines Flight 5342, a regional jet, collided near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). The incident resulted in the deaths of all 67 occupants aboard both aircraft, including 28 members of the figure skating community. It was identified as the deadliest aviation disaster in the United States in over two decades.
A year-long NTSB investigation concluded that the collision stemmed from "deep, underlying systemic failures" across multiple organizations rather than a single cause or individual error. NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy stated that these conditions contributed to the tragedy. The NTSB's objective was to identify primary contributing factors and issue recommendations to prevent future incidents.
"The NTSB's objective was to identify primary contributing factors and issue recommendations to prevent future incidents."
Contributing Factors and Identified Issues
The NTSB identified several factors and systemic issues contributing to the collision:
Airspace Congestion & Equipment Failures
- The helicopter's flight path was located within some of the nation's most congested airspace.
- The Army helicopter's Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) transponder was not operational. The passenger jet was equipped to transmit, but not receive, ADS-B signals.
Human Factors & Air Traffic Control Issues
- An instrument failure in the Army helicopter caused its pilots to believe they were flying 100 feet lower than their actual altitude.
- Air Traffic Control (ATC) Workload and Communication:
- A single controller managed both local air and helicopter traffic on the night of the collision.
- The controller experienced an increased workload, with 10 aircraft 10-15 minutes prior to the collision, and 12 aircraft (seven airplanes, five helicopters) approximately 90 seconds before impact, which reportedly reduced situational awareness.
- The NTSB found incomplete communications between the local controller and the helicopter pilots, noting that a safety alert should have been issued and a supervisor should have assigned separate duties after the controller reported being overwhelmed.
- Communication difficulties also included the word "circling" in an ATC instruction to the helicopter two minutes before the collision, which was likely inaudible.
Visual Separation Challenges
- Air traffic controllers at Reagan National Airport frequently relied on "visual separation." While the Army Black Hawk, on a training mission using night-vision goggles, requested and was approved for visual separation, NTSB analysis indicated the helicopter pilots likely did not visually identify the plane. This could have been due to limited visibility with night-vision goggles or a mistaken belief that the jet was another aircraft lining up for a different runway.
Altitude Deviations and Pilot Visibility
- The helicopter was found to be flying at nearly 91 meters (300 feet), exceeding its maximum route altitude of 61 meters (200 feet), at the time of the collision.
- An animation presented by investigators demonstrated limited visibility for pilots in both aircraft due to ambient lights and obstructions from windshields and night vision goggles.
Criticisms of Regulatory Oversight and Unaddressed Concerns
The NTSB directed criticisms towards the FAA and highlighted deficiencies in the Army's safety culture:
Unaddressed Warnings and Data
- The FAA reportedly had records of over 80 serious close calls between helicopters and passenger aircraft in recent years but did not address these conflicts. Since 2021, there have been 15,200 air separation incidents near Reagan Airport involving commercial airplanes and helicopters, including 85 close calls.
Inadequate Separation and Route Oversight
- The NTSB noted that the FAA had not recognized the inadequate separation provided by the helicopter route from planes on Reagan's secondary runway, deeming a separation of 23 meters (75 feet) unacceptable.
- The FAA was mandated to conduct annual evaluations of helicopter routes for safety but reportedly produced no evidence of recent compliance and failed to act on recommendations to reroute helicopter traffic.
- The FAA refused to include detailed helicopter route information on pilot charts.
Bureaucratic Impediments
- NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy stated that repeated concerns and recommendations over the years from air traffic controllers had gone unaddressed due to bureaucratic processes within the FAA.
NTSB Recommendations
The NTSB approved nearly 50 new recommendations, focusing on deficiencies in air traffic management, route design, and enforcement of safety standards. A key area of recommendation includes:
- Expanded ADS-B Technology: The NTSB recommended the wider adoption of ADS-B tracking technology. Specifically, it proposed that any aircraft required to use ADS-B 'out' technology in certain airspace should also be required to use ADS-B 'in' to receive signals. This expansion, including to military aircraft, could have provided earlier warnings to pilots. The NTSB has previously recommended expanding ADS-B use over a dozen times since 2008.
Legislative and Administrative Responses
The NTSB's findings and the collision itself have prompted actions and debates among government bodies and lawmakers:
Immediate FAA Actions
- The FAA implemented a permanent change to separate helicopter and plane airspace near Reagan National Airport, reduced the airport's hourly plane arrivals from 36 to 30, and increased staffing, with 22 certified controllers and eight trainees. The agency stated it values the NTSB's input, collaborated on the investigation, implemented urgent safety recommendations issued in March 2025, and plans to consider additional recommendations.
Justice Department Findings
- In December, the Justice Department determined that the federal government was liable for the crash due to actions by both the Army helicopter crew and FAA air traffic controllers.
The Proposed National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
- The NTSB has expressed opposition to a provision within the proposed NDAA. NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy stated that this provision could introduce exemptions to the policy mandating military aircraft broadcast their position using ADS-B technology, potentially re-establishing conditions similar to those present during the collision. Homendy reported that the NTSB was not consulted during the drafting of this NDAA provision.
Congressional Advocacy for the ROTOR Act
- Senators Ted Cruz (R-Texas), Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.), Jerry Moran (R-Kans.), and Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.), leaders on the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, issued a joint statement. They noted that the NDAA, in its current form, would permit military aircraft to operate in Washington D.C. airspace under distinct rules and with outdated transmission requirements, despite an increase in military aircraft accidents since 2020.
- These senators advocate for the bipartisan ROTOR Act, a bill that incorporates many of the NTSB's recommendations. The bill aims to mandate ADS-B technology for aircraft operators and restrict exemptions for military helicopters. It passed the Senate unanimously but has stalled in the House of Representatives, with Committee Chairman Sam Graves (R-Mo.) expressing concerns about the bill's cost and suggesting waiting for a final report from federal safety investigators.
Victim Families' Advocacy
Family members of the collision victims have actively advocated for aviation safety reforms and participated in the drafting of the ROTOR Act. Tim and Sheri Lilley, parents of Sam Lilley, the first officer of Flight 5342, along with other affected families such as Doug Lane and Rachel Feres, have voiced concerns regarding the NDAA's language and urged Congress to implement safety recommendations without further delay. They have expressed a commitment to continue their advocacy until the recommendations are enacted into law.