Iran's Radar Strikes Expose Middle East Missile Defense Vulnerabilities

Iran has repeatedly targeted missile defense radars across the Middle East, reportedly in retaliation for a joint U.S.-Israeli air campaign. These attacks on high-value radars appear to have succeeded in multiple instances, demonstrating the vulnerability of critical, largely static assets to lower-end long-range kamikaze drones.

The success of these attacks highlights a critical vulnerability: expensive, static missile defense radars are susceptible to damage from relatively inexpensive, long-range kamikaze drones.

Documented Radar Incidents

Reports indicate significant success in these targeting efforts and suggest other similar systems may have also been destroyed or damaged.

• U.S. AN/TPY-2 Radar in Jordan: Iran reportedly destroyed one U.S. AN/TPY-2 radar in Jordan. Satellite imagery from Planet Labs, obtained by CNN, showed the AN/TPY-2 radar damaged or destroyed following an Iranian attack on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base. The U.S. military is reportedly expediting its replacement.

• U.S.-made AN/FPS-132 Radar in Qatar: An AN/FPS-132 phased array radar in Qatar was damaged on the first day of the conflict. At least one of its three arrays was hit, with satellite imagery from Planet Labs, obtained by the Middlebury Institute, confirming damage and signs of a possible fire.

• THAAD Batteries in UAE and Saudi Arabia: Additional Planet Labs imagery suggests that AN/TPY-2 radars and their associated infrastructure were targeted and potentially damaged in Iranian attacks on THAAD batteries in the United Arab Emirates (Al Ruwais, Al Sader) and Saudi Arabia (near Prince Sultan Air Base).

• U.S. AN/TPS-59 Radar in Bahrain (Disputed): Claims surfaced regarding a drone hitting a U.S. AN/TPS-59 ballistic missile defense radar in Manama, Bahrain. However, Planet Labs imagery obtained by The New York Times suggests damage to large satellite communications terminals at NSA Bahrain, which often sit inside spherical radomes, rather than the radar itself.

• Sdot Micha Facility in Israel: Iran's PressTV reported that the Iranian Navy launched a kamikaze drone attack targeting "strategic carbon-based radar installations at the Sdot Micha facility" in Israel, which hosts Arrow-series anti-ballistic missile defense systems.

Implications of Damage and Vulnerability

Immediate Impacts and Costs

The loss or damage to these critical radars raises serious concerns. It could immediately degrade regional missile defense capabilities, potentially hindering interception efforts and increasing vulnerability to subsequent attacks. Such incidents also reduce regional situational awareness and carry strategic implications.

These radar systems are exceptionally expensive and demand years for procurement and replacement. An AN/TPY-2 radar is estimated to cost between $250 million and $300 million. A 2013 package for an AN/FPS-132 radar, adjusted for inflation, is valued at over $2.1 billion. Only 16 AN/TPY-2s are understood to have been produced globally, underscoring their rarity and strategic value.

The destruction or damage of these multi-million-dollar, rare radar systems not only creates immediate defense gaps but also poses a long-term challenge due to their high cost and lengthy replacement cycles.

Evolving Threats and Inherent Vulnerability

Strategic air and missile defense architectures now confront evolving threats, including long-range one-way-attack drones and capable cruise/ballistic missiles. These threats are proliferating to smaller nation-states and non-state actors. Fixed or semi-fixed radar installations are inherently vulnerable due to their known locations and the limited physical hardening options that are permissible for signal transmission.

Previous incidents have highlighted these vulnerabilities. A Ukrainian drone attack on a Russian early warning radar in 2024 and reported drone incursions over a U.S. missile defense site on Guam in 2019 serve as precedents. Even minor damage can lead to a 'mission kill' for these fragile arrays, disabling them for extended periods.

Future Defense Strategies

Bolstering Terrestrial Defenses

These events underscore the urgent need for more robust, deeply layered defenses to protect strategic radar systems, which current arrangements appear to lack. Overmatch against fixed defenses remains a significant vulnerability, as an adversary can calculate the munitions required to overwhelm known defensive measures.

The Shift to Space-Based Sensors

An argument is made for migrating missile tracking capabilities from terrestrial systems to space-based sensors to enhance redundancy and augmentation. While the U.S. military utilizes space-based early warning sensors, they primarily detect launches rather than tracking a weapon throughout its entire flight cycle. Efforts are underway to develop new satellite constellations for persistent mid-course missile tracking, but these capabilities are still years away from widespread deployment.

Shifting to orbit-based sensors also presents its own risks, including growing threats to assets in space. To mitigate this, the U.S. military is investing in new distributed constellations with large numbers of smaller satellites to increase resiliency against potential attacks.

Migrating missile tracking to space-based sensors offers a long-term solution to the vulnerabilities of static ground radars, but faces challenges from development timelines and the growing threat to space assets.