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2025 China Military Power Report Highlights PLA Modernization, Taiwan Dynamics, and Internal Changes

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2025 China Military Power Report Highlights PLA Modernization, Taiwan Dynamics, and Internal Changes

The US Department of Defense released the 2025 China Military Power Report (CMPR) on December 23. This congressionally mandated annual review provides observed military and security developments involving the People's Republic of China (PRC) from the previous year. The 2025 CMPR focused on PLA technological modernization, its posture toward Taiwan and the South China Sea, and personnel changes within the PLA and PRC defense industry. The report identifies PLA developments in 2024 as posing challenges to the United States, Taiwan, and other Indo-Pacific states. The United States, Japan, and Taiwan have emphasized increased defense spending and an expanded military presence in the Indo-Pacific to address PLA developments and PRC actions.

PLA Modernization and Power Projection

The CMPR notes the PRC's focus on enhancing its power projection capabilities within the first and second island chains. This includes integrating artificial intelligence (AI) and cyber capabilities into existing systems and incorporating lessons from the conflict in Ukraine.

  • Naval Expansion: The CMPR reported that the PRC aims to produce six additional aircraft carriers by 2035, totaling nine.
  • Aviation Development: The PRC continues to develop its sixth-generation aircraft and new airborne early warning and control aircraft designed for anti-jamming and passive detection.
  • Missile Systems: The PLA Rocket Force's new DF-27 intercontinental ballistic missile, with a reported maximum range of 8,000 kilometers, would enable strikes across the Pacific and into parts of the Northwestern continental United States.
  • Key Investments: Additional areas of PRC investment include unmanned systems, AI-based technology, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities, and biotechnology.
  • Civilian Vessel Armament: Naval News confirmed reports on December 25 that the PRC cargo vessel Zhong Da 79 was equipped with vertical launch systems (VLS), radar, and close-in weapon systems (CIWS, typically found on modern surface combatants). Imagery indicates the vessel has between 48 and 60 VLS cells, comparable to a modern frigate or destroyer. These VLS can fire anti-ship or anti-air missiles with ranges up to 540 km. The CIWS offers defense against missile or drone attacks. The US Department of Defense reported in 2024 that the PRC was developing a missile launcher concealable in a cargo container, capable of launching the YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missile. It remains unclear if the VLS launchers on Zhong Da 79 can be concealed. This development aligns with the PRC's "military-civil fusion" policy, which aims to integrate civilian technologies and systems into military modernization efforts.

Cross-Strait Relations and Taiwan Developments

  • PRC Actions Toward Taiwan (as per CMPR): The CMPR highlighted multi-domain pressure tactics by the PRC toward Taiwan. The report detailed PRC operations across diplomatic, information, military, and economic domains aimed at achieving unification with the PRC through a combination of incentives and targeted pressure below the threshold of war. The CMPR identified four primary campaigns for PRC unification with Taiwan: a short-of-war pressure campaign, a joint firepower strike campaign, a joint blockade campaign, and a joint island landing campaign. The joint island landing campaign is identified by the CMPR as the most decisive option for the PRC, despite associated risks.

  • Justice Mission 2025 Military Exercise: The PRC conducted large-scale military exercises simulating a blockade of Taiwan from December 29-30, named Justice Mission 2025. This was the second such exercise in 2025, with blockade exercises around Taiwan increasing in frequency since Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te’s inauguration in May 2024. The exercise rehearsed operational elements to isolate Taiwan, employing naval and coast guard assets for blockade enforcement and counter-intervention operations. It did not involve PLA Navy aircraft carriers. The exercise reportedly included rehearsals of amphibious and air assault operations off Taiwan’s east coast and long-range rocket fire. PRC messaging emphasized the blockade aspects of the exercise.

  • China Coast Guard (CCG) Patrols:

    • Kinmen Islands: The CCG conducted four patrols near Taiwan’s Kinmen Islands in December 2025. One patrol on December 18 involved four CCG ships entering Kinmen’s restricted waters and subsequently its prohibited waters (functionally equivalent to territorial waters), marking the first reported such incident since May 2024. Other patrols exhibited variations in timing and ship numbers. The CCG patrols into Kinmen’s waters began in February 2024.
    • Other Outlying Islands: The CCG also conducted patrols around Taiwan’s Matsu, Wuqiu, and Pratas islands during the Justice Mission 2025 exercise. Announced maps showed patrol groups coming within 1.3 nautical miles of Matsu and 1.6 nautical miles of Wuqiu, placing them within the islands' prohibited waters. Unlike Kinmen patrols, CCG operations around Wuqiu and Matsu have typically coincided with major blockade drills. The PRC began patrols into Pratas' waters in February 2025. ISW-CDOT confirmed 46 Kinmen incursions and 32 Pratas incursions in 2025.

  • PLA Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) Activity: The PLA conducted 274 sorties into Taiwan’s ADIZ in December 2025. Of these, 125 occurred during the two-day Justice Mission 2025 exercise. The frequency of incursions outside the exercise was lower than the recent monthly average. Since President Lai's inauguration in May 2024, PLA incursions into Taiwan's ADIZ have averaged over 300 per month, more than double the average of the preceding two years. The volume of aerial activity requires a response from Taiwan.

  • PRC High-Altitude Balloons: The PRC flew six high-altitude balloons through Taiwan’s ADIZ in December 2025, with at least three passing directly over the island. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) detected balloons at altitudes between 31,000 and 50,000 feet, which is below typical weather balloon and aircraft altitudes. The MND indicates their function may be surveillance. The PRC has conducted similar balloon flights over Taiwan between November and April for the past three years.

  • Taiwanese Internal Politics: Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) voted 60-51 to initiate impeachment proceedings against President William Lai Ching-te for not promulgating a law passed by the LY. Taiwanese law requires a two-thirds majority in the LY (76 votes) and a two-thirds majority in the Constitutional Court for presidential removal. The opposition Kuomintang (KMT)-Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) coalition lacks the 76 votes in the 113-seat legislature required. The LY Judiciary and Organic Laws Committee also voted on December 18 to petition the Control Yuan to impeach Premier Cho Jung-tai. Cho defended his refusal to countersign bills, noting the LY could hold a no-confidence vote, which would allow him to request President Lai to dissolve the LY and trigger new elections.

  • PRC AI Influence Allegations: Japanese media outlet Yomiuri Shimbun reported on December 27 on leaked documents suggesting the PRC uses AI to influence foreign elections, including in Hong Kong and Taiwan. The report, referencing documents from Vanderbilt University’s Institute of National Security, indicated that the PRC company GoLaxy attempted to influence public opinion during foreign elections through network surveillance, influencer identification, and the creation of fictional characters to spread information. GoLaxy denied creating a “bot network” or influencing elections in August. The report also referenced leaked audio recordings that Taiwanese officials allege reveal PRC efforts to influence the 2018 Kaohsiung mayoral election. Han Kuo-yu, current president of Taiwan’s LY, denied PRC interference in that election. Taiwan has expressed concerns about PRC interference in its elections and called for public education on disinformation tactics.

Internal PRC Affairs

  • PLA Leadership Changes and Anti-Corruption Efforts: The PRC continues corruption investigations and leadership changes within the PLA and its defense industry, emphasizing loyalty and ideological purity. On December 22, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping promoted Yang Zhibin to general and commander of the Eastern Theater Command (ETC), replacing Lin Xiangyang, who was removed in October 2025 for corruption. Han Shenyang was promoted to general and commander of the Central Theater Command (CTC), replacing Wang Qiang. On December 25, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) revoked the membership of four former executives of state-owned enterprises with ties to the PLA: Cao Jianguo, Zhang Dongchen, Zeng Yi, and Fan Youshan. Revocation of CPPCC membership is often linked to allegations of misconduct. A PLA defense procurement website notice on December 18 requested information on suspected "irregular" transactions involving the PLA Air Force. PRC rhetoric, including in the PLA Daily and a December 26 State Council readout, emphasizes countering corruption and maintaining ideological purity within the military.

  • PRC Sanctions: The PRC sanctioned 10 individuals and 20 defense firms following US arms sales to Taiwan. The sanctions froze assets of entities including Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation, L3Harris Maritime Services, and Boeing in St. Louis. Sanctioned individuals included defense executives like Palmer Luckey, CEO of Anduril. This marks a recurrence of PRC sanctions against individuals and firms involved in US arms sales to Taiwan; a previous package in December 2024 sanctioned 13 firms and six executives. Both sanction packages targeted entities involved in drone production.