Russian Ballistic Missile Strikes Lviv Amidst Escalated Drone Campaign, Sanctions Enforcement, and Security Guarantee Discussions

Russian forces recently conducted a confirmed ballistic missile strike on Lviv Oblast, marking a notable expansion of their long-range attack capabilities. This strike occurred amidst a sustained drone and missile campaign targeting Ukrainian infrastructure and civilian areas. Concurrently, the United States intensified its enforcement of sanctions against Russian-linked oil tankers in the Caribbean Sea and North Atlantic.

Diplomatic efforts continued regarding security guarantees for Ukraine, with Western nations discussing future support and troop deployments. Meanwhile, Russia reiterated its rejection of such guarantees and outlined its own conditions for a peace agreement.

Russian Missile and Drone Operations

Ballistic Missile Strikes on Lviv Oblast

Between January 8 and 9, Russian forces conducted an Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strike against Lviv Oblast. This significant event was confirmed by both Ukrainian and Russian officials. The missile was reportedly launched from the Kapustin Yar test site.

Visual evidence indicated the strike occurred in the vicinity of southwestern Lviv City, with OSINT analysts and Russian milbloggers assessing the target as the Lviv State Aircraft Repair Plant. A senior Ukrainian official reported the Oreshnik hit an unspecified state enterprise.

Claims by some Russian sources that the strike targeted an underground gas storage facility in Stryi, Lviv Oblast, were denied by Ukrainian officials and experts due to a lack of evidence of critical damage to gas infrastructure.

Russian officials, including Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev, issued statements referencing Oreshnik missiles in the context of deterring Western support and potential troop deployments to Ukraine.

Widespread Drone and Missile Attacks

Russian forces conducted multiple drone and missile strikes across Ukraine, targeting various regions, including critical, energy, industrial, and civilian infrastructure.

• January 6-7: Ukrainian Air Force reported the launch of one Iskander-M ballistic missile and 95 drones (including Shahed-type and Gerbera-type). Ukrainian forces reportedly downed 81 drones, with 14 striking eight locations. Strikes on residential infrastructure in Dnipro City injured at least 10 people, including two children. Three civilians were injured in Kryvyi Rih. Port and commercial infrastructure in Odesa Oblast and Zaporizhzhia City were also hit, resulting in two civilian fatalities and eight injuries.

• January 7-8: Russian forces launched 97 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones. Ukrainian forces reportedly downed 70 drones, while 27 struck 13 locations. Strikes hit civilian and energy infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, causing widespread power outages, including a near-total blackout in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Zaporizhstal, a Ukrainian steel company, suspended production due to power interruptions.

• January 8: Two Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles struck apartment buildings in Kryvyi Rih, injuring 17 civilians and damaging 29 buildings. Drones also struck port infrastructure in Odesa Raion, damaging an oil storage tank.

• January 8-9: A long-range combined drone and missile strike, involving various missile types (including Iskander-M, Kalibr, and a medium-range ballistic missile) and numerous Shahed-type drones, caused extensive power outages in Kyiv Oblast. Strikes damaged critical, residential, educational, and transport infrastructure in Kyiv City and Oblast, leading to four fatalities and at least 25 injuries in Kyiv. Over 500,000 consumers in Kyiv City and 3,000 in Chernihiv Oblast experienced power loss.

• January 9-10: Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile and 121 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones. Ukrainian air defenses downed 94 drones. The missile and 27 drones struck 15 locations, with drone debris falling at one additional site. Strikes targeted agricultural, energy, industrial, and port infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa oblasts.

• January 31 - February 1: Russian forces launched 90 drones, including Shaheds. Ukrainian forces downed 76 drones, while 14 struck nine locations. Strikes affected residential and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. In Zaporizhzhia City, a maternity hospital was struck, causing a fire and injuring at least six people. In Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, four Shahed drones struck a bus transporting miners near Ternivka, resulting in at least 12 fatalities and 16 injuries.

Sanctions Enforcement and Diplomatic Responses

US Seizure of Russian-Linked Oil Tankers

The US Coast Guard and Navy seized three oil tankers between January 7 and 9, citing links to Russia and attempts to bypass US sanctions on Venezuelan oil.

• Bella-1 (Marinera): On January 7, the Bella-1 was seized in the North Atlantic Ocean, approximately 300 kilometers south of Iceland. It was reportedly not transporting oil. The vessel is linked to Louis Marine Shipholding Enterprises S.A., previously sanctioned for supporting the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF). The Bella-1, formerly flying a Panamanian flag, was authorized by the Russian Ministry of Transport to fly the Russian flag under the name Marinera as of December 24.

• M/T Sophia: Also on January 7, the M/T Sophia was seized in the Caribbean Sea, transporting an estimated 1.8 to 2 million barrels of Venezuelan crude oil. This vessel is linked to Sunne Co Limited, sanctioned in January 2025 for involvement in the Russian economy and shipping Russian crude oil sold above the $60 per barrel price cap.

• Olina: On January 9, the US Navy seized the Olina in the Caribbean Sea. The Olina reportedly shares an identifying number with the Minerva M, previously sanctioned for transporting Russian oil, and loaded crude oil from Venezuela in late December.

US Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem confirmed the vessels had either recently docked in or were en route to Venezuela. A US official stated Russia had deployed a submarine and other naval assets to escort the Bella-1 prior to its seizure. White House Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated the detentions were carried out under a court order, with the Bella-1 crew to be brought to the United States for prosecution.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) confirmed the presence of Russian citizens among the Bella-1 crew, called for their fair treatment and prompt return, and condemned the seizure, rejecting US assertions and claiming Western sanctions on Venezuelan oil are illegitimate.

The MFA described the Bella-1 as having "temporary permission" to fly a Russian flag. Several other tankers operating near Venezuela have reportedly switched to Russian flags in an effort to evade sanctions.

Ukraine Security Guarantee Negotiations

Discussions on potential security guarantees for Ukraine progressed in Paris on January 7, involving US, Ukrainian, and Coalition of the Willing officials. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner. Newly-appointed Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Kyrylo Budanov described the negotiations as having achieved “tangible results.”

On January 6, President Zelensky outlined details from Coalition of the Willing decisions, including the identification of countries that would lead in guaranteeing a ceasefire on land, sea, and air, and in Ukraine's reconstruction. The command and control structure for a multinational force for deployment to Ukraine was also determined. Technical details were not made public, and the monitoring mechanisms, size, and components of Ukraine's post-war military remain under discussion.

Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and France signed a declaration of intent on January 6. This declaration states France and the United Kingdom's intention to deploy armed forces as part of a multinational force, engage in deterrence operations across various domains, assist in constructing and protecting facilities for military resources in Ukraine, and establish a negotiating group for a broader international agreement with other Coalition of the Willing members.

European leaders indicated potential contributions:

• Belgium: Expected to contribute to sea and air obligations and support Ukrainian force training.
• Sweden: Expressed willingness to provide Gripen fighter jets for aerial surveillance, maritime resources for Black Sea demining, and train Ukrainian forces.
• Germany, Spain, and Lithuania: May deploy ground forces to Ukraine post-conflict as part of the multinational force.

Zelensky also mentioned progress in “bilateral security guarantees” and “trilateral” documents, anticipating their signing soon. However, he noted that territorial issues and control over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) remain unresolved and may require direct discussion with US President Donald Trump if delegation-level negotiations do not advance. Trilateral meetings involving US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations are planned for February 4 and 5 in Abu Dhabi.

Russian Rejection of Guarantees and Diplomatic Demands

Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova on January 8 explicitly rejected security guarantees for Ukraine being finalized by the United States and Europe as part of a peace agreement.

Zakharova labeled these efforts as "militaristic declarations" and stated that Western military deployments to Ukraine would be considered a "foreign intervention," a "direct threat" to Russia's security, and "legitimate combat targets."

The MFA reiterated calls for any peace agreement to address alleged "root causes" of the conflict, including Ukrainian neutrality, "demilitarization," "denazification," protections for ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers, and recognition of "territorial realities" (referring to Russia's illegally annexed Ukrainian territories).

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in a recent interview, advocated for bilateral negotiations with Russia, excluding Ukraine and Europe, and presented Russia as open to negotiation to secure control over all of Donetsk Oblast. Reports citing sources suggest Russia views a frozen frontline in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts, along with the cession of all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, as a "concession." Russia had previously rejected a Ukrainian proposal for a demilitarized zone in Donetsk Oblast in December 2025.

UK Preparations for Post-War Troop Deployment

The United Kingdom (UK) is preparing for the possible deployment of troops to Ukraine as part of security guarantees in a future peace agreement. On January 9, the UK government allocated £200 million (about $268 million) to prepare British forces for a multinational deployment to post-war Ukraine. The funding will upgrade vehicles, communication systems, counter-drone protections, and force-protection equipment. The Kremlin has consistently stated that Western security guarantees are "unacceptable" and that foreign troops would be "legitimate" targets.

Russian Military Capabilities and Build-up

Challenges in Staffing New Units

The Russian military command continues to establish new units and formations, but is assessed to likely face challenges in fully staffing them. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on January 7 that the Russian military formed four new divisions (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 71st Motorized Rifle Division, 55th Naval Infantry Division, and 120th Naval Infantry Division) out of 17 maneuver divisions and up to nine brigades planned for 2025, though these are likely not at their full doctrinal strength.

Reports indicate recruitment for the 1244th Guards Artillery Brigade (31st Combined Arms Army reserve) and the formation of the 76th Rocket Artillery Brigade in the Leningrad Military District. Additionally, the 34th Artillery Division is reportedly being created in the Moscow Military District, including two artillery brigades. These formations may be part of previous military reforms. However, high losses in Ukraine suggest Russia will struggle to bring these new units to their full doctrinal strength.

Mashovets observed a shift in Russian force structure, moving from pre-war mechanized divisions to assault infantry- and light vehicle-heavy divisions with limited armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), trucks, and minimal organic air defense, artillery, and logistics. This aligns with assessments that wartime equipment losses, insufficient AFV production, and tactical shifts have led Russian forces to optimize for positional warfare.

Mashovets assessed that Russian forces are unlikely to generate a surplus of over 70,000 troops in 2026, a number deemed insufficient to form the planned 17 maneuver divisions.

The Ukrainian General Staff indicated that Russian forces incurred approximately 416,570 casualties throughout 2025, averaging 1,141 casualties daily. Then-Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on December 27 that Russia has not developed its strategic reserve to desired capabilities, as it "constantly" deploys its operational reserve to support ongoing combat operations in Ukraine.

Military Infrastructure Expansion Near Finnish Border

Russia is expanding its military infrastructure near the Finnish border. Satellite imagery indicates construction at the Rybka military base in Petrozavodsk (Republic of Karelia), approximately 175 kilometers from the Finnish border, where the 44th Army Corps (Leningrad Military District) will be stationed. A new military town is also being built in Kandalaksha, Murmansk Oblast (approximately 115 kilometers from the Finnish border), for a new artillery and engineering brigade. This follows Russia's restructuring of the Western Military District into the Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts in 2024 to enhance strategic command along its northern border and posture against NATO.

Ukrainian Strikes on Russian Territory

Ukrainian forces continued long-range and mid-range strikes against Russian military and industrial infrastructure.

• January 7: Geolocated footage showed a large fire at the Salyut plant in Moscow, which manufactures military and civilian aircraft engines. A drone strike was also reported against the Vladimir Putin Spetsnaz University in Gudermes, Chechnya.

• January 6-7: The Ukrainian General Staff reported a strike on the Oskolneftesnab oil depot near Kotel, Belgorod Oblast, approximately 90 kilometers from the frontline, resulting in a large fire. Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov acknowledged the strike.

• December 30-31: The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed damage to two RVS-5000 vertical tanks at the Temp oil depot near Rybinsk, Yaroslavl Oblast.

• Early January 2026 (Freedom of Russia Legion claim): The all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) claimed a sabotage mission destroyed 15 trucks of the Russian 350th Motorized Rifle Regiment in Kochegury, Belgorod Oblast.

• January 2-7 (Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reports): Ukrainian forces reportedly struck several Russian energy and defense facilities, including:

  • The Afipsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai (overnight January 2-3).
  • The Yaroslavl Oil Refinery in Yaroslavl Oblast.
  • The Kirovo-Chepetsky Chemical Plant in Kirov Oblast.
  • The Dorogobuzh Chemical Plant near Novomykhailovskoye, Smolensk Oblast (overnight January 5-6).
  • The Novokuybyshevsk Oil Refinery in Samara City (overnight January 1-2).

• January 9-10: Ukrainian forces reportedly hit the Zhutovskaya oil depot in Oktyabrsky Raion, Volgograd Oblast. Geolocated imagery and NASA FIRMS data confirmed a fire in the area.

• January 9-10: Ukrainian forces conducted mid-range strikes against Russian military and energy infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast, targeting a Russian 76th Airborne Division personnel concentration in Kurakhivka, a command and observation post in Hirnyk, and an electrical substation in Zorya and Volnovakha.

• January 2-7 (USF Commander Brovdi reports): Drone strikes against a deployment point in Selydove and a command post in Hirnyk belonging to the Russian 76th Airborne Division in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Drone strikes against a Russian ammunition depot in occupied Novokazankuvate and logistics hubs in occupied Khliborobne and Sofiivka.

• January 2-7 (Occupied Crimea): Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian artillery ammunition depot in occupied Mizhirya, approximately 217 kilometers from the frontline.

• Recently (Source 3): A drone strike against the Oryol Thermal Power Plant in Oryol City.

Frontline Military Operations

Northern Axis (Sumy Oblast)

• Advances: Geolocated footage on January 6 indicates Russian forces recently advanced in northern Yunakivka, northeast of Sumy City. Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Yablunivka, northeast of Sumy City. Unconfirmed claims from a Russian milblogger suggested elements of the Russian 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade seized Andriivka, north of Sumy City. Unconfirmed claims from a Russian milblogger on February 1 suggested advances east of Bila Bereza and southwest of Komarivka.
• Attacks: Russian forces conducted attacks northwest, north, northeast, and southeast of Sumy City. A relatively large-scale combined assault was reported between Andriivka and Oleksiivka. Elements of the Russian 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade reportedly encountered difficulties advancing toward Ryasne from Hrabovske. Reports indicated disarray among Russian servicemembers in a forested area along the border. Russian forces continued offensive operations on January 10 and February 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Eastern Ukraine

• Northern Kharkiv Oblast: Russian forces continued offensive operations but made no confirmed advances on January 7, 10, or February 1. Attacks occurred northeast of Kharkiv City and near Velykyi Burluk, including Zelene, Buhruvatka, Vilcha, and Vovchansk. Geolocated footage showed Ukrainian forces striking Russian-occupied buildings in Vovchansk during infiltration missions. A Russian milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Symynivka. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to have seized Zelene on February 1, though a Russian milblogger disputed this, reporting heavy casualties and issues with casualty evacuations.

• Kupyansk Direction: Russian forces conducted offensive operations and infiltrated east of Kupyansk, in eastern Podoly, without confirmed changes to terrain control on January 7, 10, or February 1. Attacks were reported near Kupyansk and surrounding settlements. Ukrainian forces reported eliminating Russian forces using small group infiltration tactics. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger indicated Ukrainian forces control areas of central Kupyansk. ISW assessed that Russian forces operating in eastern Kupyansk maintain a connection to Russian infiltrators in the northern outskirts of Kupyansk. Unconfirmed Russian milblogger claims stated advances in Kindrashivka and to the eastern outskirts of Tyshchenkivka. Ukrainian forces reportedly eliminated a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group attempting to infiltrate Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian servicemember along the P-79 Kupyansk-Chuhuiv highway during an infiltration mission.

• Borova Direction: Russian forces continued offensive operations on January 7, 10, and February 1 without confirmed advances. Geolocated footage and milblogger reports indicated Ukrainian forces likely liberated Nova Kruhlyakivka and maintained control over northern Bohuslavka. Russian forces attacked northeast and southeast of Borova. Ukrainian forces struck Russian servicemembers infiltrating Oleksandrivka. A Russian source published footage purportedly showing elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army raising a flag in Novoplatonivka, though geolocation places this in occupied Kolomyichykha.

• Slovyansk-Lyman Direction: Russian forces continued offensive operations on January 7 and 10 without confirmed advances. Attacks were reported near Lyman and surrounding areas (northwest, north, northeast, and east of Lyman). A Ukrainian brigade spokesperson reported intensified Russian offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction from the Serebryanske forest and near Dronivka, involving attempts to cross the Siverskyi Donets River by small groups in rubber boats. Unconfirmed claims of Russian advances in eastern Svyatohirsk, central Ozerne, and north of Pazeno were made. Russian forces conducted a FAB-250 glide bomb strike against Slovyansk on January 10, injuring seven. Geolocated footage indicates Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Riznykivka. Russian forces conducted attacks in several areas, with Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacking near Riznykivka, Drobysheve, and Yarova.

• Siversk Direction: Russian forces continued offensive operations on January 7 without confirmed advances. Attacks occurred near Siversk and its surrounding settlements (northwest, south, and southwest of Siversk).

• Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka Tactical Area: Russian forces infiltrated the eastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka on January 7, but no confirmed advances were made. Claims of Russian seizures in Novomarkove and Sofiivka were made. Ukrainian forces were observed operating in areas previously claimed by Russia. Russian drone ranges have reportedly increased, complicating Ukrainian logistics. Russian forces continued offensive operations on January 7 and 10 without confirmed advances. Unconfirmed Russian milblogger claims reported advances in eastern Kostyantynivka, Minkivka, Mayske, and other nearby locations. Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka and its surrounding areas. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, with geolocated footage showing Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions on the southern outskirts of Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage on February 1 shows Ukrainian forces striking a house in eastern Minkivka occupied by Russian forces after an infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain. A Ukrainian brigade spokesperson refuted Russian claims of seizing Kostyantynivka, stating that Ukrainian forces are eliminating individual Russian infiltration groups.

• Dobropillya Tactical Area: Russian forces continued offensive operations on January 7 and 10 without advances. Attacks were reported northeast, east, and southeast of Dobropillya.

• Pokrovsk Direction: Russian forces continued offensive operations on January 7 and 10 with no confirmed advances. Claims of advances west of Rodynske were made. Ukrainian officials reported Russian advances towards Hryshyne and Rodynske, with mechanized assaults targeting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs). Russian forces are reportedly shifting from overt assaults to covert infiltration tactics in Myrnohrad. ISW assesses Russian infiltration north of Pokrovsk, with intermixed positions in industrial areas. Unconfirmed Russian milblogger claims reported seizure of Rodynske and advances northwest of Pokrovsk. A Russian milblogger indicated Ukrainian forces advanced northwest of Udachne. A Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion commander reported maintaining fire control over Russian GLOCs in the Pokrovsk direction, which impedes Russian resupply. Russian forces are exploiting poor weather for infiltration and mechanized assaults, using guided aerial glide bombs (KABs) for fire support against Ukrainian positions daily. Ukrainian and Russian positions are reportedly interspersed on the northern outskirts of Pokrovsk on February 1, with dense fog hindering drone operations but enabling resupply and evacuation. Russian forces are conducting infiltration attempts in fireteams, occasionally using ATVs. The Russian MoD claimed to have seized Sukhetske.

• Novopavlivka Direction: Russian forces continued offensive operations on January 7 and 10 without confirmed advances. Ukrainian forces repelled a platoon-sized mechanized assault. Russian forces attacked near and within Novopavlivka and surrounding areas on February 1.

• Oleksandrivka Direction: Russian forces continued offensive operations on January 7 and 10 without confirmed advances. Russian forces attacked northeast and southeast of Oleksandrivka on February 1.

Southern Axis

• Hulyaipole Direction: Russian forces infiltrated central Bratske northwest of Hulyaipole without confirmed changes to terrain control on January 7. Russian sources claimed the seizure of Bratske. Attacks occurred near and around Hulyaipole. Geolocated footage from January 7 indicates Russian forces recently advanced in northern Hulyaipole. ISW assessed the Russian forward edge of battle area (FEBA) in northern Hulyaipole to be farther south than previously assessed. A source affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on January 6 that Ukrainian forces cleared Russian small groups that had infiltrated into the Ukrainian near rear in several locations northwest and north of Hulyaipole on January 5, reportedly exploiting unfavorable weather. Russian forces continued offensive operations on January 10 and February 1 but made no confirmed advances. Street fighting is reported, with Russian forces using infiltration tactics and a combination of drones, aviation, and artillery. A Russian milblogger claimed advances west and south of Svyatopetrivka on February 1. Ukrainian forces continue mid-range strikes against Russian military assets in the rear.

• Western Zaporizhia Oblast: Russian forces continued offensive operations on January 7 and 10 without confirmed advances. Attacks were reported southeast, west, and northwest of Orikhiv. Unconfirmed Russian milblogger claims reported advances in central Novoyakovlivka, northern Prymorske, and north of Stepnohirsk. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported Russian attempts to infiltrate Ukrainian lines near Malokaterynivka at the end of 2025, using the former Kakhovka Reservoir bed, which were eliminated by Ukrainian forces. Geolocated footage indicates Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast on February 1. Ukrainian forces were shown detaining Russian prisoners of war near Novoyakovlivka.

• Kherson Direction: Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults on January 7 and 10 without advances. Attacks occurred east and west of Kherson City, and east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge. A Russian drone strike near Tarasa Shevchenka killed one civilian, and strikes on central Kherson City killed at least four and wounded seven. A Russian milblogger claimed an explosion at an SBU building in Kherson City. No fighting was reported on February 1. The Atesh Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported disabling a transformer cabinet of a Russian communications tower near occupied Strelkove.

Technology Developments

Ukrainian Interceptor Drone Production

Ukraine continues to collaborate with Western partners to expand the production of interceptor drones. UK Defense Minister John Healey announced on January 9 that the UK will begin producing Ukrainian-designed "Octopus" interceptor drones, capable of intercepting Russian Shahed-type drones, starting January 2025.

The UK aims to produce thousands of these drones monthly, with each costing less than 10 percent of a Russian Shahed drone. Designs will be updated every six weeks to counter Russian technological adaptations.

Russian forces have been modifying their Shahed drones with cameras, radio control, thermobaric warheads, and MANPADS.

Starlink Restrictions for Russian Forces

SpaceX CEO Elon Musk confirmed that Starlink satellite terminals operating in Ukraine have been restricted to counter their use by Russian forces on drones. Musk stated that SpaceX had taken "effective" measures and requested Ukrainian authorities to inform them of any further necessary steps. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov acknowledged the "real results" of SpaceX's initial actions and ongoing collaboration.

This follows reports of Russian forces utilizing Starlink terminals to extend the range of strike drones for mid-range attacks in Ukraine's rear. Russian military bloggers reported that these restrictions are causing significant disruptions to Starlink-enabled Russian drones, particularly affecting speeds over 75-90 km/h. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense advisor Serhiy Beskrestnov stated that the MoD would work with SpaceX to gather information on Ukrainian military Starlink users to avoid affecting their operations.

Other Regional Activity

Belarusian Border Activity

Belarus is reportedly increasing the number and frequency of balloon incursions into Polish and Lithuanian airspace. Polish authorities reported "balloon-like" objects in Polish airspace on the night of January 31 to February 1, aimed at reconnaissance and testing air defense responses. This marked the third such incident in four days for Poland, while Lithuania reported 42 Belarusian balloons in its airspace on January 27-28. Belarus may have received one to two Su-30SM2 fighter jets from Russia in a January 29 delivery.

German Drone Sightings

Several unidentified drones were observed flying over German military infrastructure on February 1, specifically above the Immelmann military airfield in Lower Saxony. German authorities have not identified the responsible party.