International Concerns Rise Over Nuclear Arms Treaties and Testing Amidst Geopolitical Shifts

Geopolitical Tensions and the Future of Nuclear Arms Control

Statements by former U.S. President Trump on the potential annexation of Greenland and actions at the Davos World Economic Forum, including the imposition of tariffs, have sparked concerns among analysts. These actions are seen as potentially impacting NATO, international norms, national sovereignty, and established trade relations.

The former U.S. administration's tariff policies included a 15 percent tariff for the European Union, with discussions of potential increases against nations defending Greenland. Proposed retaliatory tariffs from Europe were estimated to significantly affect both U.S. and EU economies. Concerns have also been raised regarding the former administration's nuclear weapons strategy and its broader influence on U.S.-EU relations.

The Evolving Landscape of Nuclear Arms Control

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (NewSTART), the sole remaining nuclear arms control treaty between the U.S. and Russia, is set to expire on February 5, 2026. Russia withdrew from NewSTART in 2023 but has reportedly continued to adhere to the deployed nuclear weapon limits of 1550 for each side.

Russian President Putin has approached the current U.S. administration about preserving these limits and renegotiating the treaty. However, White House responses have been described as unenthusiastic, casting uncertainty on the treaty's future. The impending expiration of NewSTART, alongside discussions of a 'Golden Dome' anti-ballistic missile defense system, remains a key point of international focus.

Russian President Putin warned that a U.S. renunciation of NewSTART would be 'a grave and short-sighted mistake' with adverse implications for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Ratified by 190 countries in 1970, the NPT stands as a cornerstone for nuclear arms control. Its primary goals are to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and encourage disarmament among nuclear-armed states. Recent NPT review conferences have concluded without full consensus, reportedly due to concerns from non-nuclear nations about the persistent large number of nuclear weapons held by nuclear powers.

A significant concern is that if NewSTART expires and the U.S. and Russia expand nuclear weapon deployments beyond the 1550 limit each, both NewSTART and the NPT could lose their effectiveness. Observers suggest that perceived challenges to international laws concerning military intervention and nuclear arms control might prompt non-nuclear nations to reconsider their own nuclear weapon policies.

European officials have consistently warned that resuming explosive nuclear weapons testing could lead to nuclear proliferation in non-nuclear countries, thereby undermining the goal of a nuclear-weapons-free world.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Statements by former U.S. President Trump concerning the U.S.'s interest in Greenland and the potential resumption of explosive nuclear weapons testing have been widely characterized as challenging international norms and the established nuclear arms control system.

Since 1996, explosive nuclear weapons testing has been subject to a global ban, underpinned by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The CTBT has been signed by 187 nations and ratified by 178.

The U.S. has signed but notably not ratified the CTBT. Russia ratified the treaty in 2000 but withdrew in 2023, citing the U.S.'s failure to ratify as creating an 'unacceptable imbalance.' China has also signed but not ratified the CTBT; some arms experts speculate that China would ratify if the U.S. were to do so.

The European Union (EU) has consistently warned that resuming explosive nuclear weapons testing would undermine the CTBT. All 27 EU member states have ratified the CTBT. The EU has actively urged all nations, especially the U.S. and other Annex 2 states (China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Russia, North Korea, India, Pakistan), to ratify the treaty and ensure its entry into force.

The EU External Action Service has explicitly described resuming explosive nuclear testing as 'unwise and destabilizing.' At the United Nations Article XIV Conference in September 2025, the EU strongly advocated for the CTBT's entry into force and pressed Annex 2 states, including the U.S., to ratify it. These conferences, which began in 1999, are dedicated to promoting the CTBT and opposing both explosive nuclear weapons testing and arsenal modernization.

The EU has reiterated its warnings that nuclear weapons testing would erode the international consensus against such activities, as enshrined in the CTBT.

The EU has consistently stated in international forums that bringing the CTBT into force is a 'top priority' for Europe.

International Monitoring Efforts and Global Responses

The EU and its member states, notably Italy, have significantly funded the International Monitoring System (IMS), a global network designed to detect explosive nuclear tests. Operating as part of the CTBT Organization (CTBTO), the IMS maintains a worldwide network of monitoring sites. The U.S. has contributed over $100 million, or at least 25 percent, to the IMS budget. Concerns have been raised regarding the implications if the U.S. were to resume explosive nuclear testing, especially given its financial support for the very system intended to detect such activities.

Italy has voiced strong opposition to explosive nuclear testing by any nation. Italian President Sergio Mattarella has cautioned that such testing 'would weaken the nuclear weapons control architecture' and warned against 'unacceptable illusions of the use of nuclear weapons.' Italy characterizes explosive nuclear weapons testing as a 'grave threat to global security and peace,' citing its 'devastating impact to environmental and humanity.'

The EU has unequivocally condemned past nuclear tests by India and Pakistan (1998) and North Korea (2006-2017). It also condemned Russia's withdrawal from the CTBT in 2023. The EU has issued a clear warning that a U.S. resumption of explosive nuclear weapons testing would jeopardize both the CTBT and the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

France and Great Britain, both U.S. allies, nuclear-armed nations, and NATO members, have expressed strong opposition to resuming explosive testing and have ratified the CTBT. France described nuclear weapons testing as 'unwise, unwanted, and provocative,' having dismantled its facilities in 1998 while maintaining 300 warheads. Great Britain ended explosive testing in 1991, abandoned its Australian test site, and currently deploys 220 submarine-based warheads.

Satellite analysis reveals significant expansion and construction of new tunnels at historic nuclear test sites in the U.S. (Nevada), Russia (Novaya Zemlya), and China (Lop Nur) over the past five years. While arms control experts do not predict imminent explosive testing, the lead time required for conducting such tests has reportedly decreased from years to months.

Analysts suggest that the most significant impact of resuming explosive nuclear testing could be on the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

NPT review conferences have been contentious, with non-nuclear countries consistently expressing dissatisfaction over the slow progress of nuclear-armed nations in fulfilling their obligations to reduce and eliminate their arsenals. A U.S. resumption of testing to modernize its weapons, it is argued, would directly contradict NPT principles.

Observers have indicated that actions by former U.S. President Trump—including the abandonment of NewSTART, the potential withdrawal from the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and considerations of resumed explosive nuclear weapons testing—could have significant and far-reaching long-term international consequences.