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US Congressional Report Raises Questions on AUKUS Submarine Sales to Australia

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AUKUS Submarine Deal Under Scrutiny Following US Congressional Report

A recent report by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) has ignited debate surrounding the planned sale of Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines to Australia under the AUKUS security pact. The report proposes an alternative approach where the United States would retain control of these submarines, operating them from Australian bases, citing concerns over US shipbuilding capacity and potential deployment commitments.

Australian officials have swiftly dismissed the report, reaffirming their unwavering commitment to the existing AUKUS agreement. However, some former officials and opposition figures have voiced criticisms, highlighting perceived imbalances in the deal's structure.

US Congressional Research Service Report Highlights

Published in January, the CRS report, authored by naval affairs analyst Ronald O’Rourke, presented arguments both for and against the sale of Virginia-class submarines to Australia. It specifically introduced an alternative "military division of labour."

Proposed Alternative Strategy

Under the alternative scenario, submarines initially earmarked for Australia would remain under US command and be operated from Australian bases. This approach was suggested as a direct means to ensure immediate deployment in a potential "conflict or crisis" with China over Taiwan.

Arguments Against Submarine Sale (Supporting US Retention)

The CRS report outlined several factors that could weigh against the current plan to sell submarines to Australia:

  • Deployment Commitment: Concerns were raised that Australian-commanded submarines might not be ordered into operation without Australia guaranteeing support for the US in a conflict, such particularly regarding Taiwan.

    Selling the submarines to Australia could convert them from assets readily available for a US-China crisis into assets that might not be available, potentially weakening deterrence and warfighting capabilities.
    Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles and the Chief of Navy were cited for statements indicating Australia would make "no promises" regarding support in such af a conflict.

  • Shipbuilding Capacity: The report underscored ongoing challenges in US submarine shipbuilding. While the US Navy has aimed to order two Virginia-class submarines annually for the past 15 years, shipyards have produced approximately 1.1 to 1.2 boats per year since 2022. The US fleet currently comprises 49 submarines against a goal of 66. Supplying Australia with three to five submarines would necessitate an increase in the US build rate to 2.33 boats per year, a rate described as currently unachievable.

  • Legislative Requirements: Existing US legislation prohibits the sale of any submarine to Australia if it would degrade US undersea capabilities. Such a sale requires presidential certification that it would not diminish the US Navy's fleet.

  • Cybersecurity Concerns: The report noted active attempts by "hackers linked to China" to penetrate Australian government and contractor systems, suggesting that sharing nuclear submarine technology could increase the "attack surface" for potential breaches.

  • Australian Armament: If Australia were to acquire its own SSNs, they would only be conventionally armed, aligning with Australia's commitments as a non-nuclear weapon state under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Alternative Australian Investment Opportunities

The report speculated that Australia could redirect funds saved from not purchasing SSNs into other defense capabilities. These could include long-range anti-ship missiles, drones, loitering munitions, or B-21 bombers, which could then be used for missions supporting both Australia and the United States.

Arguments For Current AUKUS Plan (Supporting Sale)

Despite the outlined concerns, the CRS report also presented arguments in favor of upholding the existing AUKUS arrangement:

  • Strategic Signaling: Selling Virginia-class submarines to Australia would send a "strong signal to China of the collective determination" of the US, UK, and Australia to counter China's military modernization. The unprecedented nature of such a sale would underscore this commitment.

  • Enhanced Deterrence: This approach would accelerate the establishment of an Australian submarine fleet, providing China with an earlier "second allied decision-making centre" for attack submarine operations in the Indo-Pacific. This is argued to enhance deterrence by complicating Chinese military planning.

  • Historical Precedent: The report drew parallels to US assistance in establishing the nuclear submarine fleets of the UK and France in the 20th century.

Australian Government's Position

Australia's Defence Minister, Richard Marles, dismissed the CRS report as "commentary," asserting that AUKUS is "full steam ahead." He referenced the US President's stated commitment to the agreement, including the transfer of Virginia-class submarines.

A spokesperson for the Australian Submarine Agency stated that AUKUS remains in the strategic interests of all three partners and that Australia's commitment is "unwavering." The spokesperson also confirmed that all partners are investing significantly in their industrial bases to ensure the success and timelines of the agreement, including the delivery of Virginia-class submarines. Australia has previously rejected proposals for a "division of labour" in lieu of acquiring its own submarines.

Criticisms of the Agreement

Former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull described the Australian government as being engaged in "an exercise of denial" regarding the agreement's progress. Turnbull, whose previous deal for French submarines was superseded by AUKUS, characterized the agreement as "lop-sided" in favor of the US.

The US benefits from a submarine base and dockyard in Western Australia at Australia's expense, without a firm obligation to sell submarines unless the US Navy can spare them.

According to Turnbull, if the US cannot provide submarines, it would not constitute reneging on the deal but rather operating within its terms, which he views as disadvantageous for Australia. He also characterized the expectation of nearly doubling US submarine build rates as unrealistic given historical performance despite significant investment.

Greens Senator David Shoebridge referred to the deal as a "pantomime," stating that any nuclear submarines Australia obtains would be US-controlled and directed, potentially compromising Australian sovereignty to US interests.

Any nuclear submarines Australia obtains would be US-controlled and directed, potentially compromising Australian sovereignty to US interests.
He suggested that the US's willingness to proceed with AUKUS, even under an "America first" approach, indicates its one-sided nature.

AUKUS Pillar One Overview

Pillar One of the AUKUS agreement focuses on Australia acquiring the technology for conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. This process is structured in two stages:

  • Stage 1: US Virginia-class Submarines: Australia is intended to purchase between three and five Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines from the US. The first delivery is projected for 2032. This transfer is contingent on the US President certifying that it will not diminish the US Navy's undersea capability.

  • Stage 2: AUKUS-class Submarines: By the "late 2030s," the UK plans to launch its first specifically designed AUKUS submarine. The first Australian-built AUKUS submarine for the Royal Australian Navy is anticipated in the "early 2040s." Australia plans to build up to eight vessels by the 2060s.

The overall cost for Australia is estimated at up to A$368 billion by the mid-2050s, which includes responsibility for securing and storing high-level nuclear waste.