This article examines Russia's evolving relationship with China, drawing a parallel to Muscovy's historical dependency on the Mongol conquest. It posits that Russia's government is becoming structurally dependent on China to support its conflict in Ukraine and maintain internal stability. The analysis explores the extent of this dependency post-war, predicting that China will serve as an economic lifeline for Russia, aligning it within China's sphere of influence, while Russia simultaneously attempts to develop alternatives.
Architecture of Russian Dependence
Russia's structural dependency on China intensified during the Russo-Ukrainian War. China became a key buyer of hydrocarbons, a supplier of complex and technological goods, and a financial facilitator.
By 2024, China accounted for 60% of new passenger car imports and 65% of truck imports to Russia. China facilitates Russia's access to the global economy by enabling transshipments of goods like wood milling machines, ball bearings, and static converters, which Russia cannot effectively produce domestically.
China also plays a crucial role in Russia's exports, with its "teapot" refineries specializing in processing sanctioned hydrocarbons. Utilizing pipelines, shadow fleets, cryptocurrency, yuan-based agreements, and barter trading, China acquires these hydrocarbons below market price. This dynamic reinforces Russia's structural dependency, as China remains one of the few available buyers.
Smaller, already sanctioned Chinese banks handle transactions, allowing larger banks to maintain global relevance. Long-term commitments, including expensive gas pipelines, multi-year mineral contracts, and integration of complex technologies, further connect Russia's economy to China's.
Post-War Challenges and Dependency Reduction Efforts
Post-war, Russia is expected to seek to reduce its dependency on China, despite facing significant challenges such as economic recession, long-term demographic decline, a potential political succession crisis, and ongoing political-economic isolation.
The immediate priority for Russian policy will likely be maintaining regime control, potentially at the expense of deeper subordination to China. The war currently unifies Russian regime factions; however, post-war, oligarchs and technocrats may seek to regain influence, potentially weakening resistance to Chinese influence. China could leverage this by offering technologies or financing to stabilize the regime, potentially disrupting domestic industry rebuilding efforts.
Russia's subordination might also be constrained by China's foreign policy objectives, which include avoiding the creation of a competing anti-American polarity while also maintaining buy-in from other partners in its sphere of influence by adhering to non-interference principles.
An eventual succession crisis in Russia, characterized by deliberately weak institutions designed to maximize personal rule, could exacerbate factional competition. China might prove indispensable in supporting a successor, which would likely come with concessions, as a new regime would require support to consolidate power. This situation echoes the Mongol yoke, where Khan's support for succession often led to increased tribute. From China's perspective, avoiding over-exploitation of its position would be critical to mitigate Russia's desire for an alternate sponsor and maintain a Chinese-friendly regime with some autonomy.
Russia will likely explore alternatives to China after the war. Initial potential partners include Iran (for technological collaboration), Vietnam, and India (as buyers of gas, oil, and weapons). Turkey is also considered critical due to its geopolitical independence within NATO, access to Western markets, and its balancing act between global powers. Turkey could offer an alternative access point to global markets and a buyer for Russian energy, gaining leverage with the United States and Europe in return.
Russia may also attempt to improve relations with NATO states, starting with smaller countries like Hungary, with a long-term goal of engaging Germany and other economic powers. The success of such efforts could depend on the rise of far-right political movements in Europe, which may favor cheaper economic inputs from Russia. If these movements are unsuccessful, Russia may face higher economic isolation, though Europe's fragmented nature might still allow for increased ties with some states.
The development of these alternative economic relationships will be influenced by post-war sanctions and existing economic ties of potential partners (e.g., Vietnam-US). However, aspects of China's value proposition, such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, vehicles, and financial mechanisms, are not easily replaced. Therefore, while developing alternatives is crucial for mitigating Chinese dependence, this process will take time and encounter resistance.
Subordination Dynamics: Functions for China
The relationship between China and Russia post-war is predicted to involve several functions for China:
- Raw Material Provider: Russia will likely become a supplier of raw materials (hydrocarbons, minerals) for China's manufacturing economy, generating income for Russia's regime survival.
- Security Buffer: Russia is expected to maintain significant forces on its western border, tying down NATO capacity and potentially diverting Western attention from the Asia-Pacific, prompting Europe to increase military spending.
- Economic Enabler and Integrator: China will likely provide critical technological components (e.g., semiconductors for missiles, vehicles) and financial support (yuan trades, credit markets). China might serve as a lender of last resort, with loan conditions potentially tied to access to infrastructure or mineral revenues.
- Regime Guarantor: In case of Russian regime instability, China could offer economic, political, and possibly military support to maintain a friendly regime, or mediate between factions.
Loss of Russian Spheres of Influence
Russia's spheres of influence are projected to narrow, potentially to Belarus, with Central Asia and the Caucasus becoming competitive areas for Russia, Turkey, and China. China became the largest trading partner for Central Asia in 2025. Countries like Armenia and Azerbaijan are expanding their multi-vector foreign policies and economic links, reducing reliance on Russia as a trade intermediary and security provider.
Analysis of a "Reverse Nixon" Strategy
The article analyzes a "reverse Nixon" strategy, where the United States and Europe could deepen ties with Russia to fracture the Sino-Russian axis. This strategy is considered unviable as long as the current Russian regime or a similar successor remains in power, given its likely continued hostile hybrid warfare policy towards the West. Russia's foreign policy from 2014-2022, when it was less dependent on China, still demonstrated hostility towards the West. The current Russian regime might exploit such an approach to gain negotiating leverage with Beijing, potentially misleading Western analysts.
Under the current Russian leadership, NATO is advised to maintain Russia's isolation through sanctions, support for Ukraine, and a strong eastern flank, rather than rebuilding a hostile regime's position, even if it means increased short-term Chinese dependence. This is based on the premise that Russia would not balance against China regardless. The original Nixon policy worked due to existing Sino-Soviet disputes, a condition not currently present.
Conclusion: A New Muscovy?
Russia's structural subordination to China is expected to consolidate post-war, driven by political-economic weakness, isolation, and the regime's prioritization of survival over geopolitical independence. While Russia will seek alternatives, their scalability will be limited. A "reverse Nixon" strategy is seen as risky, potentially empowering a regime already within China's orbit.